Review of David M. Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014) by Craig, MM
 Craig, MM
 Review of David M. Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and 
Eden in the Cold War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014)
http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/6431/
Article
LJMU has developed LJMU Research Online for users to access the research output of the 
University more effectively. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by 
the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of 
any article(s) in LJMU Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or 
any commercial gain.
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of the record. 
Please see the repository URL above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
For more information please contact researchonline@ljmu.ac.uk
http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/
Citation (please note it is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you 
intend to cite from this work) 
Craig, MM (2016) Review of David M. Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink: 
Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2014). History: the journal of the Historical 
Association, 101 (348). pp. 824-825. ISSN 0018-2648 
LJMU Research Online
Dr Malcolm Craig (University of Edinburgh), review of: 
 
David M. Watry. Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in 
the Cold War (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 2014) 240 pp. 
$29.95, ISBN 978-0-8071-5718-3. 
 
Nearly seventy years on from Winston Churchill’s speech in Dayton, Ohio that 
was the rhetorical backbone of the US-UK ‘special relationship’, the topic of 
Anglo-American relations – special or otherwise – remains a thriving and 
vibrant field of study. Every year, new archival releases, revisionist takes on 
old stories, and contemporary crises permit historians to re-evaluate and re-
assess critical post-war episodes. Likewise, university courses on the subject 
continue to attract legions of undergraduates and postgraduates keen to delve 
into the conjoined but fractious trans-Atlantic affiliation. 
 David Watry’s new book Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, 
and Eden in the Cold War enters this crowded field boldly claiming to re-
evaluate Dwight D. Eisenhower’s foreign policy towards his closest allies and 
his fiercest enemies. In the service of this aim, Watry has impressively 
researched and substantiated his work, drawing as he does upon a wide 
range of archival sources from both sides of the Atlantic.  
 Within the book’s six substantive chapters, Watry clearly describes the 
critical differences between the Eisenhower-Churchill relationship and the 
Eisenhower-Eden relationship. The former was warm and friendly – although 
at times strained – founded in the shared experience of World War 2 
leadership. The latter relationship was dominated by tension and 
disagreement, as the ill, pain-wracked Anthony Eden antagonised the 
President and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles (a particular figure of 
dislike for the Foreign Secretary turned Prime Minister). None of this is 
particularly new, but Watry paints a convincing, engaging picture of the 
relationships and the ways in which they affected ties with the Middle East 
and the Soviet Union, to name but two areas of contention. 
 Less convincing is the analysis of Eisenhower’s attitude towards 
nuclear weapons. This is a significant point, as Eisenhower was involved in 
more ‘nuclear crises’ than any other president of the United States. Watry 
suggests that Eisenhower’s seeming willingness to deploy and potentially use 
tactical nuclear weapons was a constant. It is true that on many occasions, 
Eisenhower did unilaterally threaten (even if only in a veiled manner) the use 
of such weapons. Moreover, the President envisaged a world with a clear 
distinction between ‘small’ battlefield nuclear weapons and the city-destroying 
monsters of the thermonuclear age – his oft cited statement that tactical 
nuclear weapons should be “simply another weapon in our arsenal” clearly 
delineating his position. Yet, Eisenhower’s attitude was malleable. Occasions 
arose where nuclear use was considered and then withdrawn in the face of a 
lack of allied acquiescence and Congressional resistance. The plan to lift the 
siege of Dien Bien Phu during the French war in Indochina is but one example. 
His prudent restraint in a whole series of Asian crises being others. Thus, 
Eisenhower demonstrated a willingness – even if grudgingly – to mould his 
strategy to meet the needs of domestic and foreign diplomacy. 
 Critically, the book is not really about Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden. 
Notwithstanding the fine job Watry does of sketching the relationships, this is 
fundamentally a work about Eisenhower and – to a certain extent – John 
Foster Dulles. If anything, the governments of the elderly Churchill and the 
ailing Eden are barely even secondary to the story of the Eisenhower 
administration’s continual deployment of brinksmanship. More on the British 
point of view would have been very welcome, especially in view of the 
impressive amount of digging that Watry has done in the British archives. 
 But to return to the positives, Watry’s analysis of the Suez Crisis – a 
story that had been told and re-told many times over – is concise and 
compelling. The author fits in with recent scholarly reinterpretations of the 
Crisis, assessments that de-emphasise Suez as the critical juncture in US-UK 
relations over the Middle East and bring into play the splits in the relationship 
(such as the Buriami Oasis affair, an event that Watry does not mention) that 
were emerging long before Operation Musketeer.  
In the final analysis, this is a book that any historian interested in the 
terrain of US-UK relations during the Cold War should read. Based on sound 
research, Watry raises intriguing points and offers new perspectives on a 
variety of topics, all anchored by the overarching theme of brinksmanship in 
the Cold War. 
